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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No. 12-3767 
___________ 
 
STATE AUTO PROPERTY & CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
v. 
 
FRANK LAGROTTA; SYLVAN 
HEIGHTS REALTY PARTNERS, LLC; 
AMERICARE MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. 
 
       Sylvan Heights Realty Partners, LLC; 
       Americare Management Services, Inc., 
           Appellants 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-00457  
(Honorable Cathy Bissoon) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 10, 2013 
 
Before: SCIRICA, HARDIMAN, VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges  
 
(Filed: June 26, 2013) 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
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The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of State Auto Property & 
Casualty Insurance Co., concluding that State Auto had no duty to defend and indemnify 
Frank LaGrotta in an underlying state court action. We will affirm.  
I. 
 Frank LaGrotta is a former member of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives 
and, during the relevant period, held a State Auto Insurance Policy. The policy provided 
coverage for “personal and advertising injury,” but excluded coverage if the injury was 
caused “with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would 
inflict „personal and advertising injury.‟” 
 Hill View Manor was a nursing home in LaGrotta‟s district operated by Lawrence 
County. The County sought to privatize Hill View, and entered in negotiations with 
Sylvan Heights Realty Partners, LLC. Due to the pending sale, Hill View‟s current 
management company decided to no longer manage Hill View, and the County entered 
into an agreement with Americare Management Services, Inc., in which Americare 
agreed to be the interim management company until the sale to Sylvan was finalized.  
 Sylvan and Americare allege that LaGrotta took actions to intentionally thwart the 
deal between the County and Sylvan.  LaGrotta issued press releases stating that there 
were improper associations between principals of Sylvan and Americare involving a 
questionable transfer of funds. LaGrotta also informed the Pennsylvania State Police 
Commissioner that the Hill View sale was entangled with organized crime. Allegedly due 
to LaGrotta‟s actions, the Department of Health withdrew its approval of the sale of Hill 
View to Sylvan and Sylvan became unable to secure financing. As a result, the County‟s 
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deal with Sylvan fell through and the County reneged on its agreement with Americare. 
 Sylvan and Americare brought a state court action against LaGrotta asserting 
claims for tortious interference with contractual and prospective contractual relationships. 
The state court complaint alleged that LaGrotta acted “with the intent  to convince [the 
County and Health Department] to withdraw their approval of the prospective sale.” 
LaGrotta asked State Auto to defend and indemnify him under his insurance policy.  
State Auto brought the instant federal action against LaGrotta, Sylvan, and 
Americare, seeking a declaratory judgment that it has no duty to defend or indemnify 
LaGrotta in the state court action. The case was referred to a Magistrate Judge and State 
Auto moved for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge concluded the policy excludes 
coverage for actions taken with an intent to cause harm and that the state court complaint 
against LaGrotta alleged that he intended to thwart the deal between the County and 
Sylvan. The Magistrate Judge therefore recommended that State Auto‟s motion for 
summary judgment be granted. The District Court granted the motion, adopting the 
Magistrate Judge‟s recommendations in whole. Sylvan and Americare timely appealed.
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II.
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 Sylvan and Americare first contend the court erred by denying their motion to 
dismiss State Auto‟s motion for summary judgment. When State Auto filed its motion for 
summary judgment, it failed to include a separate statement of material facts, as required 
                                                   
1
 LaGrotta did not file an appeal. 
 
2
 The District Court had jurisdiction of this diversity action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The parties agree Pennsylvania law applies. 
4 
 
by the Local Rules of the Western District of Pennsylvania. When Sylvan and Americare 
moved to dismiss State Auto‟s motion on this ground, State Auto requested leave to file a 
statement of facts, explaining that because the only relevant evidence in the record was 
the insurance policy and the state court complaint, it did not think it needed to file a 
separate statement of material facts. The next day, the Magistrate Judge granted State 
Auto‟s motion for leave to file a statement of facts, and State Auto merely relabeled the 
exhibits it attached to its motion for summary judgment as a statement of material facts. 
 We review a district court‟s decision to depart from its local rules for abuse of 
discretion. See United States v. Eleven Vehicles, Their Equipment and Accessories , 200 
F.3d 203, 214-15 (3d Cir. 2000). “[A] district court can depart from the strictures of its 
own local procedural rules where (1) it has a sound rationale for doing so, and (2) so 
doing does not unfairly prejudice a party who has relied on the local rule to his 
detriment.” Id. at 215. Additionally, the Local Rule at issue provides that a court may 
decline to follow it “based on the particular facts and circumstances of the individual 
action.” W.D. Pa. LCvR 56(A).
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As the Magistrate Judge explained, there is no disagreement about the underlying 
facts of the case. The relevant record consists only of the insurance policy and the state 
action complaint. Additionally, Sylvan and Americare have not argued they suffered any 
prejudice as a result of State Auto‟s failure to file a statement of material facts. They  
                                                   
3
 Sylvan and Americare argue the court effectively extended the deadline for filing the 
summary judgment motion, and thus the issue should be analyzed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
6(b), which pertains to the extension of deadlines. We disagree and, like the lower court, 
consider the issue to be whether strict compliance with the local rule was required. 
5 
 
were still able to file a complete and timely response to State Auto‟s motion for summary 
judgment. Accordingly, we see no abuse of discretion. 
III. 
 Sylvan and Americare next contend the court erred in granting State Auto‟s 
motion for summary judgment. They argue the policy is ambiguous about whether it 
excludes coverage for intended harm. Alternatively, they contend the state action 
complaint alleges recklessness, so the exclusion does not apply.
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A. 
 The policy provides coverage for “personal and advertising injury,” which the 
parties appear to agree encompasses the injuries asserted in the state court complaint. The 
policy excludes coverage for personal and advertising injuries “[c]aused by or at the 
direction of the insured with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of 
another and would inflict „personal and advertising injury.‟” The policy later explains 
that personal and advertising injury arises from, inter alia, false arrest, malicious 
prosecution, wrongful eviction, slander and libel, invasions of the right of privacy, and 
use of another‟s advertising idea or copyright in an advertisement.
 
 
 Sylvan and Americare contend that the definition of personal and advertising 
injury creates an ambiguity because it defines such injury with examples of intentional 
torts. Accordingly, they argue, the policy cannot be understood as unambiguously barring 
                                                   
4
 We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, drawing all inferences in favor of 
the nonmoving party. N.J. Transit Corp. v. Harsco Corp., 497 F.3d 323, 326 (3d Cir. 
2007). Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine dispute of material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 
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coverage for intentional conduct. We disagree. The exclusion is not inconsistent with the 
definition of “personal and advertising injury,” as the definition is not limited to 
intentional torts. For example, defamation can be based on negligence. See Rutt v. 
Bethlehems’ Globe Publ’g Co., 484 A.2d 72, 83 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984). Additionally, 
“[t]he courts of Pennsylvania have refused to require an insurer to defend an insured for 
his own intentional torts and/or criminal acts” because it would be against public policy. 
Germantown Ins. Co. v. Martin, 595 A.2d 1172, 1175 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). Accordingly, 
the policy excludes coverage for intended harm. 
B. 
 Sylvan and Americare next argue that the state court complaint alleges 
recklessness in addition to intentional conduct, so the exclusion does not apply and State 
Auto is required to defend and indemnify LaGrotta. Under Pennsylvania law, the duty to 
defend is determined solely by the allegations contained within the four corners of the 
complaint. Kvaerner Metals Div. of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. , 
908 A.2d 888, 896-97 (Pa. 2006). It is the facts alleged in the underlying complaint, not 
the cause of action pled, that will determine if there is coverage. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Baumhammers, 893 A.2d 797, 811 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), aff’d in part and rev’d in part 
on other grounds, 938 A.2d 286 (Pa. 2007).  
 Sylvan and Americare argue the complaint alleges recklessness because the 
complaint states LaGrotta‟s actions were “unprivileged, improper, and reckless.” We 
disagree. Those allegations are legal conclusions, and when determining whether an 
insurance policy applies, we look to the factual allegations. See Mut. Benefit Ins. Co. v. 
7 
 
Haver, 725 A.2d 743, 745 (Pa. 1999). We agree with the trial court that the facts allege 
an intent to harm, not recklessness. The complaint states, inter alia, that LaGrotta acted 
“with the intent to convince [the County and the Department of Health] to withdraw their 
approval of the prospective sale,” and “with intent to cause or induce the County to not 
sell Hill View to Sylvan.” The County‟s decision not to sell Hill View to Sylvan was “the 
intended result” of LaGrotta‟s actions. Accordingly, the court correctly concluded the 
exclusion applies and that State Auto is not required to defend or indemnify LaGrotta in 
the state court action.
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IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the entry of judgment in State Auto‟s 
favor. 
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 Based on our conclusion, we need not reach the issue of whether an “occurrence” is 
required to trigger coverage for personal and advertising injury. 
